On February 4, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Xinping released a lengthy joint statement laying out their vision for a new approach to global governance. The statement got little attention in Western countries, absorbed as they were with the pandemic and escalating tensions over Ukraine. However, its lofty vision will become abundantly clear this year as the world adjusts to its practical new realities.
We lived in a bi-polar world from the end of the Second World War until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. During this period, the United States led a variety of coalitions pursuing a post-war order based on its example of liberal democracy, while the Soviet Union competed for influence around the world based on Russia’s socialist model of centralized control. A Westphalian nuclear balance kept direct conflict contained while the two coalitions sparred at the UN and other international institutions. When the Soviet Union economically imploded, we entered a uni-polar American-dominated world order widely anticipated to yield a global ‘peace dividend’. Western governments were emboldened by the notion that their open economies and democratic systems proved more resilient than the socialist alternative, and presumed their values to be an ultimate expression of Natural Law.
But if economic strength underpins military might, then it became inevitable that Russia enriched by natural resource exports and China by its manufacturing base would eventually become capable of challenging the American-dominated world order. And so they have, for the simple purpose that the Party leaders in both countries have a grandiose picture of their historic right to territorial hegemony that today overlaps several sovereign nations. Western nations do exert a variety of forms of influence over other nations, and not always with the highest purpose, but they rarely occupy them by force. Contrast this with China’s imposition of maritime control in the South China Sea, and Russia’s military interventions in both Kazakhstan and Ukraine just this year. The emergence of a new Russian-Chinese bloc capable of projecting significant conventional military power affords them unprecedented influence at the global governance table below the ultimate nuclear threshold. And this is why their joint statement is so important.
Here are some of the major principles in the Russia-China joint vision:
- Both claim to be long-standing democracies, but reserve the right to implement democracy in ways “that would best suit its particular state”, and not according to a “one-size-fits-all template”. In other words, while Western nations evaluate a representative democracy based on how its processes and institutions facilitate Citizen self-determination, Russia and China are free to view democracy as a social outcome chosen by the Party in which the people participate “in accordance with the law”.
- Both hope “the United Nations and its Security Council play a central and coordinating role” implementing the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and foster “key areas of cooperation such as poverty reduction, food security, vaccines and epidemics control, financing for development, climate change, sustainable development including green development, industrialization, digital economy, and infrastructure connectivity”. They do not believe the UN should have any authority to intervene militarily or politically in the affairs of any nation, and are actively using their Security Council veto to ensure no such resolution passes.
- Both affirm that “the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set noble goals in the area of universal human rights”, but they oppose “ interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states under the pretext of protecting democracy and human rights”. Therefore, “human rights should be seen through the prism of the real situation in every particular country, and human rights should be protected in accordance with the specific situation in each country and the needs of its population.” In other words, universal human rights are not.
- The joint statement advocates a world in which each country addresses geopolitical issues with each other via bilateral relations, and rejects the use of international alliances and institutions. This reflects a distinction drawn by Russia and China between control exerted over satellite states that work to their advantage and western treaty relationships that work to their disadvantage. They do however claim support for the multilateral trade system that protects their economies from more powerful national competitors.
It should be obvious that Russia and China would prefer to refine global governance in ways that play to their advantages as centrally controlled governments and economies. They appreciate being members of multilateral bodies whose actions they can selectively nullify when it suits them, rather than having to deal with direct military, political, and economic competitors. Yet they want to preserve a free hand when dealing with weaker, individual nations.
The western world will not agree to these terms, but we are watching unfold the end of international institutional authority where it most matters. It is doubtful that Russia, in control of Ukraine, will have any interest in Security Council resolutions, UN Peacekeepers, inquiries by the International Criminal Court or UN Commission on Human Rights, or even humanitarian aid channelled through such bodies as UNICEF. Any of these would be perceived by Russia as infringing on its sovereign territorial rights. China’s ongoing treatment of minority populations within its borders already shows its agreement with this position.
We are left with a world divided into two camps by very different views of justifiable sovereignty. Nations and national leaders who place party or politician over the Citizen, or who engage in behaviour that makes them international pariahs, will naturally gravitate to the Russia-China sphere for mutual support. The advanced western nations and those dependent on their market access or protection will form another bloc that seeks to preserve the post-WWII liberal democratic order. It is unlikely the two blocs will again face off as NATO and the Warsaw Pact did during the Cold War, but life for Citizens will be distinctly different in the new order.
It will be interesting to see whether the international institutions will have to be downsized to Western members to remain effective, or if they can retain some global legitimacy amidst a newly bi-polar world.